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The Supreme Court’s ruling against the government is measured and restrained in tone – but it is
the most important constitutional case the Court has ever heard, writes Jo Murkens. The Justices
have ruled that the government cannot leave the EU without Parliament’s consent. And while they
also declared EU membership a reserved matter and therefore one that must be decided at
Westminster rather than by devolved institutions, this is unlikely to be the end of the story.
UK Supreme Court building. Credits: Cary Bass-Deschenes (CC BY-SA 2.0).
The UK Supreme Court had two main questions to decide in Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union. The ﬁrst question is familiar from the ruling in the Divisional Court in October: can the Secretary of State
serve notice of the intention to withdraw from the EU under Art 50 TEU without prior authorisation by an Act of
Parliament? The second question adds a devolution dimension from a separate challenge in Northern Ireland: do
the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 require the agreement of the devolved legislature?
With a majority of 8 to 3, the Supreme Court Justices dismissed the government’s claim that parliamentary approval
was not required. Lord Neuberger’s decision, with which seven other judges agreed, is an exercise in good
housekeeping. It contains few constitutionally controversial or politically combustible statements. The Justices
acknowledge that the European Communities Act 1972 authorised a ‘dynamic process’ by which EU law becomes
an autonomous and overriding source of UK law.
UK law has, as a result, changed as a result of EU membership, sometimes even without further parliamentary
approval – a process which the ECA 1972 clearly envisages. Does that mean that Parliament also envisaged that
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ministers could bring about the UK’s withdrawal from the EU without parliamentary approval? This is an issue that
Lord Neuberger seeks to dispel:
‘There is a vital diﬀerence between changes in domestic law resulting from variations in the content
of EU law arising from new EU legislation, and changes in domestic law resulting from withdrawal by
the United Kingdom from the European Union.’ [78]
What the government wishes to do is to exercise political power unilaterally which would fundamentally change the
constitutional arrangements of the UK. Such a change is diﬀerent in kind from any variations to be expected in
relation to the content of EU law. Leaving the EU will be as signiﬁcant a constitutional change as joining the EEC in
1973.
The loss of an independent source of law is a fundamental legal change that is compounded by changes in
domestic rights, with which the Divisional Court was concerned last October. As a result, the prerogative power
cannot be used by ministers to trigger Art.50 TEU, and the prior authority of an Act of Parliament is required. If you
are looking for the clearest statement in the judgement, it is arguably this statement in paragraph 82:
‘We cannot accept that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be achieved by
ministers alone; it must be eﬀected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by
Parliamentary legislation.’
In the ﬁnal sections the UKSC clariﬁes the legal signiﬁcance of the June referendum and of Northern Ireland. It
conﬁrms that the referendum was not legally binding and cites oﬃcial government acceptance of that position. This
is not to say that the referendum has no eﬀect whatsoever. Its eﬀect is political, and ‘it has already shown itself to be
of great political signiﬁcance’ [124].
The UKSC’s verdict on devolution will disappoint some, and it does not form a signiﬁcant part of the decision. The
weight of the main question, whether the Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires that primary legislation be passed
before Art.50 is invoked, is greatly reduced by the overall decision of the UKSC which stresses the need for primary
legislation from Westminster. The UKSC is unanimous in rejecting a formal role for the Northern Ireland Assembly
ahead of Art 50, and its reasoning is certainly coherent. The devolution legislation assumes that the UK would be a
member of the EU, but does not require it to be a member. Since EU membership is clearly a reserved matter, the
decision whether or not to give notice under Art 50 falls squarely to the Westminster Parliament.
But the question surrounding Art 50 in the present appeal is clearly not the end of the constitutional story. Paragraph
132 is perhaps the most cryptic paragraph of the decision. The UKSC reiterates its overall conclusion about the
importance of legislation in the context of devolution:
‘It would accordingly be incongruous if constraints imposed on the legislative competence of the
devolved administrations by speciﬁc statutory provisions were to be removed, thereby enlarging that
competence, other than by statute.’
Since Westminster must now give prior legislative authorisation, the UKSC does not think it is ‘necessary to reach a
deﬁnitive view’ on the EU constraints and provisions empowering the implementation of EU law in the Northern
Ireland Act. The Northern Ireland Assembly does not have a veto. But that is not to say that its consent will not be
needed when it comes to changing the NI Act 1998 to give legal eﬀect to EU withdrawal. This is a space that needs
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to be watched.
Miller is the most important constitutional case the UKSC has ever heard – and it boils down to this: the government
requires the authority of primary legislation before it can change the laws of the UK constitution. It is a reminder of
the function of a constitution and of the rule of law. It is a testament to the independence of the judiciary at a time
when it has come under pressure from the media and some politicians. It is a re-statement of the obvious when all
the other questions surrounding withdrawal from the EU are uncertain. The legal and procedural issues have now
been resolved. Our MPs will now have to face the much more controversial and combustible political and
substantive issues in Parliament.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article was ﬁrst published at LSE Brexit and it gives the views of the author, and not the position of
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